Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice

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Published with the support of
The Maurice J. Sullivan & Family Fund
in
The University of Hawaii Foundation

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF HAWAII
Honolulu

Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 78-60744

Buddhist Theories of Existents: The Systems of Two Truths

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Later (post-fifth century) Indian scholars, when confronted with the enormous mass of divergent canonical and commentarial literature produced by the past, regarded the systems of teachings set forth in the Buddhist scriptures as representative of three distinct enunciations of the doctrine by the Buddha, called "the three turnings of the dharma-wheel."[1] Likewise, they regarded the commentarial traditions which explained the preceding as contained within four major philosophical schools.

The first turning of the dharma-wheel consisted of the teachings of the Hīnayāna; the second was the teaching of the *Prajñāpāramitā* or perfection of wisdom class, a Mahāyāna doctrine; and the third was another kind of Mahāyāna doctrine, as exemplified by the theories of the *Saṅdhinirmocana-sūtra* and others. The theories of the first turning of the dharma-wheel were systematized in the *abhidharmas* of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools; those of the second, by Nāgārjuna around the first century into the Mādhyamika; and those of the third, by Āryāsanga around the fifth century into the school of the Vijñānavāda or Yogācāra. These four systematizations of the three dharma-wheels, the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika, and Yogācāra, are the four

schools of philosophical tenets produced by Indian Buddhism, the first two belonging to the Hīnayāna, and the latter two to the Mahāyāna. This idea of three turnings of the wheel of the Buddhist doctrine, originally set forth in the *Saṅdhinirmocana-sūtra*, is not, however, an inclusive classification of all the teachings contained in the Buddhist sūtras. Rather, it represents three radically different ontological determinations which served as the basis for three formulations of the entire system of Buddhist theory and praxis. Thus, running the whole range of the ontological spectrum, the first enunciation of the doctrine took as its basis the position that all existents (dharmas) are reals; the second, that all existents are unreals; and the third, that whereas some existents are unreals, others are reals. Thus, after the fifth century, it was a man's determination of the nature of "things," in the direction of a realism or a constructionism,[2] which principally led him to elect to follow the practice of Buddhism according to one of the four schools. The four schools continued to be studied and to serve as the basis of practice until the final disappearance of Buddhism in India in the twelfth century.[3]

Here, however, even Buddhist determinations in favor of a realism differed significantly from those of non-Buddhists. Even in its rise, Buddhism seems to have represented some radical departures from the mode of thinking of the entire ancient world, and so to have laid the ground for later achievements in scientific thought which were indeed to become the jewel ornaments of ancient Indian culture.

The several centuries preceding the appearance of the Buddha were a time of enormous intellectual ferment in North India, when itinerant teachers, of both Brahmanical and non-Brahmanical persuasions, promulgated a wide variety of philosophical doctrines, ranging from Brahmanical orthodoxies rooted in the Upaniṣads to atomism, strict determinism, and skepticism. Often these teachers succeeded in attracting a large following. The multiplicity of available doctrinal options and the obvious bewilderments incidental in determining among them are remarkably paralleled in many ways by

the same kind of intellectual foment occurring during the same period in Greece, where the followers of religious fraternities and various philosophical schools, joined shortly by the Sophists, were carrying new theories and scientific information through the cities of Greece. In both these civilizations that were to foster the higher culture that was later to spread throughout a major portion of the world, the early systems of philosophical speculation produced almost at the start the sharp metaphysical cleavages which were subsequently to become one of the hallmarks of philosophy.

The emergence of these early speculative systems with a soteriological import does not appear as something sudden and abrupt, for prior to their appearance the national mythologies apparently had undergone a process of structuring, by means of principles of interpretation derived in part from observation of the regularity and periodicity of meteorological and other natural phenomena, a structuring which made them yield fairly coherent systems of cosmogenesis and soteriology.[4] The early systems of speculation in both Greece and India display a preoccupation with structures already imposed on the national mythologies by the end of the late archaic period, and these structures seemingly provided the early philosophers with sets of presuppositions as they gazed partly at the world and partly at the mythos.

In India, the first system of philosophical speculation was the Sāṃkhya, the earlier formulations of which are to be found in the later Upaniṣads or Vedānta which were developing the theory of identity between an ultimate and monadic basis of the universe called the Brahman and the innermost essence of the living being, the ātman. The Upaniṣads had allegorized and interpreted the hymns and sacrificial formulae of the Vedas in terms of this ātman theory, which was held to have constituted their inner meaning originally. From the matrix of this Upaniṣadic doctrine of the equivalency of the Brahman and the ātman, the Sāṃkhya scheme sought to derive the multiplicity of the phenomenal world from a series of descending permutations or evolutes of a single primary

stuff[5] called Nature (prakṛti), which persists as a substratum for its own constantly changing qualities. In the midst of the multiplicity of the things, the prime knower or soul, the primeval Person (puruṣa), creates for itself a labyrinth wherein it is lost and suffers by mistakenly identifying these creations of Nature as somehow related to its own self. Consequently, there exists the possibility of the soul's deliverance from the sufferings involved in the phenomenal world by a gnostic realization of its own original nature as in no way related to Nature's productions. This is to be accomplished, according to the Sāṃkhya scheme, by a course of devolution by means of which the self progressively divests itself of its mistaken identifications with these productions of Nature, beginning with the most gross and concluding with the most subtle, for the soteriological path is an exact reversal of the cosmogenic path through the stages of which the self had become enmeshed and enmired in creation and by the reversal of which it constructs a path of emancipation. Thus, together the two paths constitute a full cycle of a world evolution giving way to a gnostically produced devolution, a cycle of the descent and ascent of the soul.[6]

The same morphology is distinctly discernable in the fragments of the earliest speculative systems produced by the Greeks. Here, too, the whole manifold of the phenomenal world is viewed as the derivative of a single stuff (the *arche* or source) functioning as a substratum which remains identical with itself in the face of its own constant modifications. Similarly discernable almost at the start is the view of the universe as a process of formation by means of a series of descending evolutes of the *arche*—e.g., the Heraclitan downward path *('odos kato)* of permutations from fire to water—and a process of dissolution through a series of ascending devolutes of the *arche*—e.g., the upward path *('odos ano)* of permutations from water back again to fire. That this cyclic process of the universe was seen as serving also as a chariot by which the soul descends and ascends to and from a gross manifestation is also clear. Regarding the cited examples,

Heraclitus states, "It is death for the soul to become water,"[7] "A dry soul is the most excellent and wisest,"[8] and so on, and here the psychic component of the cycle of the universe is too obvious to be overlooked.

In both cultures, this monistic basis or tendency of early philosophy to derive the many from the one appears to have been rooted in the authority of its respective religious traditions, in the Indian instance, in the Upaniṣads as exegesis of the Vedas, and in the Greek instance, in the Hellenic mystery traditions of which the earliest speculators were devotees and initiates.[9] As, however, the articulation of such theological constructs moved from the mythopoetic to the discursive, it quickly came under the sway of correct discourse or logic, and what may have been a cosmos to intuition soon became a chaos to sense. For however transparently self-luminous the unity of the all, or the development of the multiplicity of the phenomenal world from an original unity, may have been to the intuition looking at the mythopoetic, it soon became a web of obfuscation to the reason, when reason was called upon to give strict accounting of it. This is to say nothing of the manifold of phenomena. There soon came to the fore the problems entailed in explaining the genesis of even a single phenomenal thing in terms of the notion of a transformation or modification of one and the same subsistent stuff, since two incompatible demands were being made of the essence of an originating thing, i.e., that it be permanent and that it be impermanent. By virtue of being one and the same subsistent, the substrate substance needed to remain identical with itself, that is to say, to be immutable and permanent, whereas by virtue of its capacity to undergo transformation it needed to be something mutable and hence impermanent. Consequently, the essence of an originating thing, since it was nothing other than the essence of the substrate substance, also had to be a permanent, whereas definitionally, since it was an originate and hence a noneternal, it had to be an impermanent.

Just as in Greece, then, where the earliest systems of the Milesian school that sought to derive all the effects from a

single cause soon gave way to other systems of explanation which saw the need for more than a single first principle to account for the genesis of the multiplicity of phenomenal things, so in India, where both the systems of the Jainas and of the Buddhists appear in part as a counterreaction to the monism of the Upaniṣads. The Jainas and the Buddhists, in addition to multiplying the number of real substances, espoused two disparate theories on the problem of the permanence or impermanence of substance and of the essence of an originating entity, so that, with the setting forth of the Buddhist dharma, three radically different determinations had been propounded by the Sāṃkhya, the Jaina, and the Buddhist. As for substance, the Sāṃkhya held one permanent stuff, Nature or prakṛti; the Jaina held five permanent stuffs, life, time, space, virtue, and nonvirtue; and the Buddhist held three permanent stuffs, space and the two kinds of cessation, along with an infinity of impermanent stuffs. As for the essence of the orignating entity, the Sāṃkhya held it to be permanent; the Jain, both permanent and impermanent; and the Buddhist, impermanent.

Here the Jains, by introducing a substantive difference between an originating thing's substance and its attributes, could hold that the essence of an originating thing *qua* substance was something permanent by being the effect of causes which were permanents, whereas by its attributes it was something impermanent. A pot, for instance, was permanent by virtue of its matter, a permanent substance, and impermanent by virtue of its qualities of origination, destruction, and so forth. Both the Sāṃkhya and Buddhism, on the other hand, admitted no substantive difference between a thing's substance and its attributes.[10] Hence, the former came to view empirical change as something only apparent, whereas the latter so viewed empirical perdurability.

For the Sāṃkhya, both the substance and the attributes were modifications of one and the same eternal stuff (Nature or prakṛti), which was without a beginning, a middle, or an end. Consequently, the essence of even an originating thing,

being consubstantial with this one eternal cause, needed also to be permanent, as no substantive difference could be admitted between the cause and the effect. Since all existents, including originates, were in essence permanent existents, the result was that causality itself became not a process of a new production, but simply the manifestation or actualization of a potential latent in the cause; for, if the potential did not exist in the cause, the effect could never arise. Here, however, to exist potentially or latently means to be there both essentially and existentially, albeit in an unmanifested manner, and consequently all effects were held to be already in existence even at the time of their producing (i.e., manifesting) causes.

The Buddhist, on the other hand, took the opposite course of determination and held that a cause and effect relation means that the effect depends, not for its actualization, but for its very existence, on the cause. For, if the entity viewed as the effect is already in existence at the time of the cause, what need is there for a cause to produce it? This argument summarizes succinctly the cardinal Buddhist theory of dependent origination *(pratītya-samutpāda)*, wherein whatever comes into existence or originates *depends for its existence* on causes and conditions and cannot for this reason exist as something permanent, all origination being thus a new production and all originates (*saṃskṛta* dharmas) being consequently impermanents.

Although in its simplest formulation—i.e., that of the Vaibhāṣika—the Buddhist theory of the impermanence of all originates permitted a substantive difference between the substance of an originating entity and its attributes of birth, aging, destruction, and so on, it was soon apparent that the quality of destruction was not—as posited by the Vaibhāṣika —a superadded quality appearing simultaneously with the genesis of an originating entity, but rather that annihilation was the very essence of the originating thing itself. Otherwise, it was argued, all things would have to be of the nature of immortality, which is to say, the destruction or annihilation of a thing would be dependent upon its meeting with an

external cause, in which case one ought to be able to find at least some examples of things which, having originated, have never met with their causes of destruction and consequently either have never disappeared or are clearly not likely to disappear in the future; and such is not so. In other words, the argument was that, for a thing to be ascertainably impermanent, it must be destroyed in every moment, otherwise it might never be destroyed at all. Consequently, the mainstream of Buddhist thought held that impermanence could mean only momentariness.

Here, the theory of impermanence as momentariness held that a thing's apparent empirical perdurability was a continuum of a seemingly identical object and its gross annihilation, viz., the breaking of a jar by a hammer or the death of a living creature, that it was just the final moment of a constant, uninterrupted series of transformations culminating in a thing's gross annihilation. In every point of time the thing was another thing; origination, duration, and destruction occurred simultaneously in each instant. Consequently, there was no substantive difference between a thing's substance and its attributes, for with every change of attribute—in particular the moment of time of its existence—the thing needed to be viewed as a completely different substance. In sharp contradistinction to the Sāṃkhya, which posited a thing's unity in a first cause, the Buddhists placed unity in an indivisible mathematical unit of a thing's extension, i.e., the impermanent atom,[11] and of a thing's perduration, i.e., an indivisible point of time. These atoms and temporal point units were not only indivisible but also extended, because indivisible units having no extension could never by aggregation produce magnitude, whereas magnitudes, if they were not a composition of indivisible units, became infinitely divisible.

The difficulties connected with depositing extension and indivisibility on the same *locus*, and the unsatisfactoriness of the Buddhist position as well as that of the Sāṃkhya, were to emerge subsequently

Particularly significant here is the predisposition of early

philosophical thinking to equate real being with the impartible, and hence the unitary. In other words, it was held, implicitly or explicitly, that for something to be truly existent, it must be of such a nature as to be partless and thus incapable of further division into other parts of the same nature or into other natures more primary and fundamental. Such an impartible will consequently be a genuine unity or "a one," inasmuch as, being simple and uncompounded, it has nothing of multiplicity in it. Viewed in the reverse manner, this means that if sense and conceptual objects can be divided indefinitely, without any limit or measurement to their divisibility, then cognition itself becomes completely indeterminate, because cognition can only cognize the measured and bounded, never the infinite and unbounded. In early Western philosophy, for instance, this consideration seems to have led Plato explicitly to posit unity or "the one" as a necessary basis or ground for being, unity being an *a priori* principle determining that things exist in a measured way. Here, "to be" means "to be one" or "to be by means of participation or dependence on one." Since in Platonism real being is not only unitary but permanent as well, the real world of being exists for Plato as an archetypal or paradigmatic realm utterly outside of time and space, the flow of the sensible world having merely a derived existence and a secondary reality through participating in the former. The phenomenal or sensible world has, in fact, been reduced to an illusion, even though neither Plato nor the later Platonists called it such. This *de facto* reduction of the sensible world to the status of an illusion was detected by St. Augustine, for whom it became a main criticism of the Platonism which he had previously embraced.

Around the first century B.C., this predisposition toward thinking in terms of a real being, along with its concomitant implications, came under a close scrutiny and vigorous attack by Nāgārjuna on purely dialectical grounds. In the Hīnayāna sūtras, many dialectical refinements as well as methods of conducting formal discussion are already evident. Nonethe-

less, with the spread of Buddhism and the polarization of Indian opinion between the self and the no-self theories, interest in the dialectic as a means for making some satisfactory determination and demonstration was given a special impetus —a situation analogous to the growth of Greek logical interest in the face of the sharp metaphysical cleavage between Heraclitus' "Everything is in flux," and Parmenides' "Nothing moves either by change or in position." Nāgārjuna, easily one of the greatest dialecticians in the history of world philosophy, took all the real existents that both Buddhists and non-Buddhists had posited up to his time and subjected them to a rigorous criticism. Through his analysis, he found all these positions to be unable to explain the nature of things without serious internal contradictions. Hence, he concluded that things are devoid or empty *(śūnya)* of that very mode of being in terms of which they were instinctively grasped, and that things become explicable, in fact, only if they are empty of that mode of being. In other words, according to Nāgārjuna, things exist as phenomena merely, and phenomena are merely names capable of association with a concept; above and beyond the name and the concept, they do not bear any independent, inherent, or intrinsic nature, nor any mode of being behind their existence. Nonetheless, they are not nonexistent either, because they are there as phenomena. The prime target of Nāgārjuna's criticism seems to have been the predisposition, whether of common sense or of philosophical speculation, to view the existing as somehow absolutely existing. If, however, something exists absolutely or really, then it has to be permanent and unchanging, and so *never* nonexistent; otherwise, it cannot have a real nature of being existent. Thus, for instance, that the impermanent atoms of the Buddhists exist is patently self-contradictory for Nāgārjuna, for even though they are called "impermanent," if they have really the nature of existence, then they must be permanent and so cannot appear and disappear. On the other hand, the permanent atoms of the Vaiśeṣika are in the same difficulty, for if they are sometimes in the state of union and at other

times in the state of disunion, then their nature changes and, consequently, they are impermanent. And this argument applies for the existence of every other kind of real. In addition to the necessity of real existents to be permanent and unchanging, they must also be either impartible or ultimately based upon the unitary, for the reasons explained previously.

This internal logic of absolutes also appeared in early Greek philosophy in the system of Parmenides, whose conclusions, however, were precisely the opposite of Nāgārjuna's.[12] In an effort to salvage the certainty of knowledge from the skepticism engendered by the Heraclitan position that all phenomenal things are in a state of perpetual flux or pure process, Parmenides sought to discover the existent in the midst of the becoming and took his stand on the dialectical ground that only the existent and never the nonexistent can be an object of cognition. Having dismissed the nonexistent as a possible object of cognition, he proceeded to define the really existent as something necessarily permanent, unchanging, and one, and went on to push his position to its logical conclusion, which posited the "real" universe as one permanent, motionless whole in which any change or movement in place could only be apparent but could not resist analysis—like the Eleatic example of the arrow in flight which cannot move. Such a purely noetic universe, however, seems in the system of Parmenides to have been unable to explain anything about the nature of the changing phenomenal world except its unrealness. Even in its subsequent adaption by Plato and the Neoplatonists, this Eleatic notion of being was not without numerous difficulties. In his famous distinction between "that which is existing always and never becomes" and "that which is becoming always and never is existent,"[13] the former accessible to thought aided by reasoning and the latter the object of opinion aided by sensation, Plato admitted into his system of philosophy both the Parmenidean world of eternal changeless being along with the Heraclitan world of pure process. The subsequent history of Neoplatonist thought is, in part, the story of the problematic of setting up a rela-

tionship between the absolutely unchanging and the changing, as more and more of the categories of Greek logic had to be hypostatized to function as links in an intermediary chain relating the two. Finally, during the later days of the Roman Empire, the problem of mediating the absolute and the phenomenal became so acute, psychologically as well as intellectually, that it became an important contributing factor in the final breakdown of Hellenism in the West.

Thus, whereas the internal logic entailed by the notion of real being as something necessarily absolute and static led Parmenides into the construction of a system of extreme monism, it became in the hands of Nāgārjuna in India one of the principal dialectical instruments for revealing the grave self-contradictions involved in applying the notion of real being to explanation of the nature of things, and so for demonstrating indirectly his own system of pure nominalism, which delimited the meaning of "to exist" as "to exist as a phenomenon" only and which repudiated all real being altogether.

Nāgārjuna had also thus reduced the whole phenomenal world to an illusion by depriving it of any real being whatsoever, just as Parmenides and many other philosophers have done; unlike other philosophers, however, he did not posit a real being elsewhere, above or beyond the phenomenal world, and he declared the final nature of all things to be just that lack of the kind of real being which things possess for ordinary apprehension, and that it is precisely this false way of apprehending things in which the illusion of the phenomenal world consists.

Consequently, while free perhaps of the problems arising from the stasis necessarily entailed by the notion of real being, the system of Nāgārjuna did not fail to arouse the objections of the schools whose reals he had subjected to criticism and found lacking that very reality. Objections were twofold: first, that his system of pure nominalism was nihilistic, since denying real being to everything must necessarily be denying many Buddhist tenets such as origina-

tion, destruction, and the Four Noble Truths, and second, that in such a purely nominalist system, knowledge itself, since it lacks the force of real being, has to become completely indeterminate and undefinable; consequently, knowledge could never affirm or deny with certainty whether things lack real being. Nāgārjuna's response to the former criticism of nihilism was that only someone who denied their real being could *de facto* accept origination, destruction, the cessation of misery and its causes by means of the cultivation of the Path, and so on, since the changes they entail can only occur if they are nonabsolutes, i.e., devoid of a real being.[14] To the objection of the indeterminacy of cognition, his answer was that just as a thing's appearance as a phenomenon is a sufficient certification for its existence, by means of which it may with certainty be delineated from something nonexistent, so cognition, whether perception or inference, knowing just that much existence is a sufficient guarantee for distinguishing a true from a false thesis.[15] It is, he says, just like the instance of the magically created apparition of two elephants which may be seen to struggle and one of which may be seen to defeat the other.[16] In other words, the skepticism which must necessarily be engendered by holding cognition to be indeterminate and incapable of all *a priori* certainty is equally addicted, as a false ideology, to the notion of real being, inasmuch as it assumes that in order to determine the right act of knowing from a wrong act of knowing, right knowing must know absolutely an object which has real being or is predicated upon real being. In this sense, the skeptic is the other side of mistaken ideologue, for the latter finds real being where there is none, whereas the former fails to locate real being and, failing, thinks that he cannot know things with certainty, because for him to be sure that he knows with certainty, he must know some kind of real being. Notwithstanding, knowledge knowing things which are existent merely as phenomena is an adequate basis for exact determination between the true and the false. Consequently, logical proof, rejection, demonstration, and so on are assured even without

admitting their real being, for what else is "the existent" except a logical construct?

This answer, while sufficient for some, did not satisfy others, for whom Nāgārjuna's pure nominalism remained too extreme in the direction of nihilism. Consequently, although Nāgārjuna's system was to provide a basis for the practice of the Mahāyāna for the Mādhyamikas, Indian Buddhism was still to evolve another basis for the practice of the Mahāyāna with a new ontology. This last doctrinal synthesis of Indian Buddhism into a system of idealist nondualism was primarily the work of Asanga, who was later joined by his brother, Vasubandhu. It is variously called Yogācāra, Vijñānavāda, and *Citta-mātra* or "mind-only."

Taking its stand on a kind of Indian Cartesianism, a *cogito ergo sum* without the *ego* but simply a "thinking is,"[17] the complex ontology devised by this system of idealist nondualism might be summarized as follows: Even if things are names, names are always associated with concepts, so that the existence of names and concepts cannot be denied. Moreover, every act of conceiving has always an object of conception, since every act of conceiving has always the form of a cognizing-cognitum. This much is given. Among the objects of conception, then, some are purely conceptual in having no existence whatsoever independently of their concept, as for instance: (1) imaginary things, such as a unicorn, or (2) many kinds of abstractions and universals, such as numbers. However, all objects of conception are not purely conceptual like unicorns and numbers, for some conceptual objects are causally efficient and perform work, such as a horse or the effects of virtuous and nonvirtuous actions. The existence of these things, unlike that of the former, is not utterly dependent on their concept, for here no matter how much the concept may be ascribing something false to its object, the basis for that ascription must be something real.

Moreover, although there is guaranteed the existence of a name-concept and the existence of a real basis for a concept the object of which is something causally efficient, it is not

also guaranteed that these efficient objects exist just in the manner in which they are apprehended by the concepts we form of them. We may be sure, in fact, that they do not, inasmuch as even a slight analysis reveals that the concept is constantly falsifying the nature of its object, as for instance when it apprehends duration on the momentary, or a self on the non-self. Consequently, the actual problem here, in the instances of these efficient objects, is to make a clear delineation between the true nature or natures which are merely being imputed to it by its concept, for the former nature is existent, whereas the latter is nonexistent. Thus, in the new ontological scheme of the Yogācāra as roughly summarized here, just as in the older system of the Mādhyamika, the phenomenon is something illusory in the sense that it is the *locus* for some kind of false imputation, since it does not exist just as it is grasped by ordinary thought. Consequently, the same phenomenon is likewise the *locus* for a nonillusory cognition, i.e., a cognition shorn of all false ascription. How the Mādhyamika viewed the actual nature of the phenomenal thing has already been briefly discussed. The Yogācāra, on the other hand, held that of the imputations superimposed on the object by its concept, the foremost was the apprehension of a substantive difference between the cognition and its object, for even though in all ordinary instances of the cognition of an external object the form of cognition-cognitum appears as *a something mental* (i.e., the cognition) and *a something nonmental* (i.e., the cognitum), Asanga had decided on grounds similar to those which led Kant to decide in favor of an idealism—i.e., the infinite divisibility of matter—that the external object which appears to its cognition as something substantively different from the cognition itself is in fact substantively the same as the cognition. Rather than representing two different kinds of substantives, the cognition-cognitum are two modalities of the same substantive, and the substantive is a mental. Hence, the actual nature of the object is just its emptiness of this kind of duality. This subject and its ramifications will be discussed later.

Between the time of Nāgārjuna and the time of Asanga, the science of dialectics had become more and more formalized into methods of logic, and a system of a five-membered syllogism was formulated by the Brahmanically orthodox school of the Nyāya. This five-membered syllogism was utilized by Asanga and Vasubandhu. The Nyāya system of logic, however, with its strong affinities to the extreme ontological realism of the Vaiśeṣika and its substantive differences between universal and particular, was ill-suited for use by the Buddhists, whose views were so much further on the side of a nominalism. Subsequently, the Yogācāra school produced a complete logical reform in the person of Vasubandhu's pupil Dignāga, in whose hands logic became a subsidiary, albeit an extremely significant, part of a full-fledged system of epistemology. A complete exposition of Dignāga's investigation of right cognition and its means was accomplished shortly after Dignāga by his disciple, Dharmakīrti. For the Buddhists themselves, this new science of epistemology and logic was an extension of their own *abhidharma*, since it demonstrated with greater force and precision than previously their principal views of impermanence, no-self, and so on, and provided these views with a sound critical basis. For this reason, the teacher Śākyamuni was saluted in the logical school as *pramāṇabhūta*,[18] a being whose knowledge and teaching was exactly in conformity with correct cognition.

Developments of logic after Nāgārjuna had also produced a division of the Mādhyamikas into two positions, for new logical considerations had given rise to questions which had not been decided earlier by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. One school of the Mādhyamika, the Svātantrika, insisted on the need for recourse to an independent inference as necessary means for demonstrating truth, whereas the other, the Prāsaṅgika, held that truth was demonstrable without recourse to *independent* inference, which was an inadmissible. The point of controversy here was not the validity of inference or syllogistic reasoning, which was not being ques-

tioned by either side; rather, it was a different view of the nature of the basis on which the validity of inference might be acceptably held to depend. The formulator of the Svātantrika position was Bhāvaviveka, and of the Prāsaṅgika position, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti.

Finally, in addition to the sūtras of the Hīnayāna and the sūtras of the Mahāyāna, which set forth the basic theories which were to be developed into the systems of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika, there were a variety of Mahāyāna sūtras dealing with specific subjects such as the Pure Land of Sukhāvati, the tathāgata-garbha or potentiality for Buddhahood existing in all living creatures, etc. These were the common property of the Mahāyānists of both persuasions who in some instances, such as that of the tathāgatagarbha, interpreted them quite differently, and these do not appear to have been representative of any third kind of Mahāyānist school in India.[19]

Still another important class of Buddhist scriptures began to spread widely in India after the fifth century, namely, the tantras. The tantras set forth another method for the practice of the Mahāyāna, a method which was held by its followers to be more effective and rapid than that set forth in the sūtras. Inasmuch as the domain of the tantras was another method of praxis, the tantras did not enunciate any new theory; historically, at least, the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika provided the theory which the tantric method sought to implement more fully. Thus, the three theories of existents, as briefly set forth in the preceding discussion, appear to represent the three, and only three, ontological determinations on which the theory and practice of Buddhism in India was grounded. These three fundamental positions served as the basis for the formalization of Buddhist teaching into the four schools, the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, the Yogācāra, and the Mādhyamika, each of which subsumes a variety of subtypes. The first ontological position, that all existents are reals, is that of the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika;[20] the second, that no existents are reals, is that of the Mādhyamika;

the third, that some existents are reals whereas some are unreals, is that of the Yogācāra.

Here the meaning of an "existent" is any phenomenon ascertainable as such by means of uncontradicted knowledge. Even in its completely realistic formulations, the theories of the Vaibhāṣika, Buddhism was quite critical and selective in what it was willing to admit into the category of a *bona fide* phenomenon or an existent. In particular, in addition to any kind of originating permanent, it refused to admit any perdurable self or soul or ego functioning as the substratum of the personality or individuality, and this uncompromising denial of any kind of substantive ego enduring from one moment to the next in the personality was one of the principal hallmarks signalizing the Buddhist theory,[21] so that adherence to the no-self doctrine *(anātma-vāda)* was synonymous with Buddhism. On the other hand, the full implications of the no-self doctrine were variously understood and interpreted by the Buddhists themselves in keeping with their determinations of a primarily ontological nature. Consequently, the no-self doctrine was explained differently against varying ontological backgrounds, both realist and nonrealist.

In India as in Greece, philosophy arose and developed fully implicated in the mind's natural bent to see everything in realist or substantialist terms, with little critical examination of its own presuppositions and often faulty lines of questioning. Hence, almost everything belonging to the phenomonology of cognition[22] was first viewed as some kind of substantive existent, these real things including not only specific perceptual data but also the objects of universals, abstractions, relations—every type of conceptual entity, in fact. There was something of a problematic in the area of objects seen in dreams, hallucinations, the illusions of magic, reflections, and so on, which resist somewhat the tendency to be viewed as altogether on a par ontologically with their "real" counterparts. It was only after the development of full-blown substantialist systems of thought that philosophy could consider the possibility of a purely conceptual construction and at-

tempt to delineate it from some kind of self-subsistent nature belonging independently to the object, for this could only be done by a critique of the substantialist theories themselves. Hence, in the course of philosophical criticism, one meets again and again instances in which the inability of a theory to withstand criticism is adduced *a fortiori* as the main support for the proposer's own alternative, and the alternative theory is left standing merely by default rather than by its own power to withstand further critical scrutiny.

The most thorough effort at the construction of a genuine philosophical critique was that of the Mādhyamika. In the later period of Buddhism in India, the arrangement of the Buddhist theories into the four main schools became formalized into a new kind of doctrinal literature of some importance subsequently, especially in Tibet, i.e., the so-called *siddhānta* or texts which delineate the tenets of the Indian philosophical schools, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. This particular kind of literature was exclusively the product of Mādhyamika scholars, e.g., Bhāvaviveka in the *Madhyamakahṛdaya* and its autocommentary the *Tarkajvālā*, and Śāntarakṣita in the *Mādhyamakālaṁkāra*. Tibetan scholarship subsequently expanded the scheme to treat systematically the varieties of the Mādhyamika.[23] This literature, in no way seeking to view the development of Buddhist philosophy in a historical perspective, represents just the final elaboration of the most ancient Mādhyamika method of demonstrating its own rather difficult viewpoint to others as readily as possible by way of criticism, e.g., Nāgārjuna's criticism of the Abhidharmikas and Āryadeva's criticism of the Sāṃkhyas. Consequently, its scheme of arrangement of the Buddhist schools from lower to higher is purely critical. The chief targets of this criticism are the various entities accepted as ultimate reals by the other schools, along with the concomitant consequences of their admissions. The general movement of its progression from "lower" to "higher" is one from the extreme realism of the non-Buddhist systems to its antithesis, the viewpoint of the Mādhyamika that there is nothing what-

soever which exists as an ultimate or as a real real. The remaining Buddhist schools represent intermediate positions standing nearer to or further from the maximal realism of the non-Buddhists and the no-realism of the Mādhyamika.

Thus, this schematic of the Buddhist schools from lower to higher, beginning with the Vaibhāṣika through the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra to the Mādhyamika, represents the Mādhyamika's own critical perspective. The higher the school, the fewer the number of reals it admits into its system. The lower schools are systems of the Hīnayāna, and the higher schools are those of the Mahāyāna; "higher" and "lower" is from the Mādhyamika point of view. It appears, moreover, that as a system admits fewer and fewer reals, the more it goes against a natural tendency to see things in realistic terms and, consequently, the harder the system may be to grasp with ease—especially without going from an extremity of hypostatization to another extremity, i.e., negation of the nonhypostatized. Nonetheless, a position equally free of these two extremities, acceptance of the hypostatized or superimposed *(samāropa)* and nihilistic depreciation *(apavāda)* or rejection of the nonhypostatized or the non-superimposed, is just the position which each of the Buddhist schools claims for itself, and in the instance of the Mādhyamika is even the meaning of the name, *Mādhyamika* or "middle-ism."

The Tibetan *siddhānta* literature, which this study will now examine, takes two truths as the basis of all the philosophical tenets of the Buddhist systems. Although the idea of two truths is primarily identified with the Mādhyamika, especially by way of Nāgārjuna's famous statement that "the teaching of the Buddha has recourse to two truths," explicit statements distinguishing two truths are to be found in other systems of Buddhist thought, including the scriptures and commentaries of the Hīnayāna, so that a system of two truths, a phenomenal truth and an ultimate truth, is indeed the common property of all the schools of Buddhism. Nonetheless, it is chiefly in the face of the more highly sophisticat-

ed ontological considerations that the notion of the two truths becomes particularly significant and revealing, especially where consideration is being given to delineating the self-subsistent character in contradistinction to the purely conceptual or constructed nature of even a *bona fide* phenomenon. In other words, many kinds of phenomena establishable as such by means of uncontradicted knowledge need not also exist as some kind of ultimate real; hence, the efforts of Buddhist philosophy to categorize existents phenomenologically, together with its efforts to determine them ontologically, is the domain of the two truths.

In the Buddhist systems, the distinctions and bases for making the distinctions between the two truths are so varied that it is impossible to generalize them beyond stating that the Buddhist systems always treat the two truths as a genuine dichotomy, which is to say that (1) all things admissable as existent are included in the two truths, and (2) the two truths are reciprocally exclusive. Hence, whatever exists is either phenomenal truth or ultimate truth. If it is phenomenal truth, it is not ultimate; conversely, if it is ultimate truth, it is not phenomenal. Again, by way of example, if the basis for making a distinction between a phenomenal and an ultimate is, as in the Svātantrika Mādhyamika, from the point of view of cognition, and the difference between a phenomenal and an ultimate is one of an object of a dual cognition as opposed to an object of a nondual cognition, any particular object, for instance a table, is a *locus* for both a dual and a nondual cognition. However, the table *qua* table as an object of cognition is not both phenomenal truth and ultimate truth, because the table *qua* table exists as an object of cognition only for a dual cognition, whereas the object of a nondual cognition is just the emptiness *(śūnyatā)* of the table.

Having indicated the dichotomous nature of the two truths, we may proceed to look briefly at the two truths in the various Buddhist systems.

On the two truths in the Vaibhāṣika, the *Abhidharmakośa* says, "When of that—like a pot or water—which is destroyed

or reduced by analysis to something else, the cognition does not arise, it exists as a phenomenon *(saṃvṛti sat)*; other things exist as ultimates *(paramārtha sat)*."[24]

What exists as an ultimate for the Vaibhāṣika is a partless atom and an indivisible moment of cognition; every other existent exists as a phenomenon. The ultimate reality set forth here is essentially atomistic, and the stability and perdurability of the phenomenal thing, more apparent than real, is in fact a continuum of the seemingly identical object, the atomistic moments succeeding one another as cause and effect. According to the Vaibhāṣika, the caused thing at the first moment of production is endowed with four qualities—origination, duration, aging, and perishing—which function successively. All other schools of Buddhism as well accept this continuum of successive moments in lieu of any kind of real perdurability. However, the others do not regard the atomistic moments as ultimate truth, and they likewise do not accept a moment of duration other than the moment of origination. Thus, for the other schools, the thing goes instantly from origination to destruction, and the phenomenal thing is annihilated in every instant. This is called by the others "subtle impermanence."

As for the Sautrāntikas who follow reason *(yukti)*, Dharmakīrti says, "Here, whatever is ultimately functional *(paramārthatas artha krīya samārthya)* exists as an ultimate *(paramārtha sat)*."[25]

What exists as an ultimate for this kind of Sautrāntika are caused entities or originates (*saṃskṛta* dharmas). Every other thing, since it is uncaused *(asaṃskṛta)*, such as space, exists as a phenomenon. Because so many of the important distinctions being made here are shared by the Yogācāra and the Svātantrika Mādhyamika (but not by the Prāsaṅgika), this definition needs to be discussed at some length. For all the Buddhist systems, the *definiens* of a dharma or ontological entity is *svarūpagrāhya*, the individuated entity or thing possessed of its own entityness, and it is synonymous with an existent and a cognizable *(jñeya)* and an object knowable through a source of prime right cognition.[26]

Dharmas are variously subdivided, and one of the most important subclassifications is a division into *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta* dharmas, or caused and uncaused entities. The former originate in dependence on causes and being impermanent; the latter are permanent and never originate. This much applies to all the Buddhist schools, but the following discussion bears mainly on the Vaibhāṣika. The *abhidharma* lists of the Vaibhāṣika enumerate three such uncaused entities (*asaṃskṛta* dharmas), i.e., space *(ākāśa)* and two kinds of cessation *(nirodha)*, whereas the other Buddhist systems find many other uncaused entities (*asaṃskṛta* dharmas) as well. As for "uncaused" *(asaṃskṛta)*, it may be seen that there are two kinds of things which may be called uncaused, i.e., nonentities such as a rabbit's horns which never appear through a source of right cognition and permanent entities such as space, the existence of which may be established through a source of right cognition. The former is altogether nonactual *(abhāva)*, whereas the latter in contradistinction to the former is some kind of actual *(bhāva)*, the *definiens* of an actual *(bhāva)* being the capacity to perform a function or to do work *(artha krīya samārthya)*. Thus, for example, in the Vaibhāṣika system, space is accepted as a permanent nonoriginating entity—an *asaṃskṛta* dharma—and, because movement is regarded as a function of space, space is accepted as a cause of movement. Similarly, the other two *asaṃskṛta* dharmas are accepted as functional *(artha krīya samārthya)*. Thus, in the Vaibhāṣika, all dharmas are functional, and hence all dharmas are actuals *(bhāva)*.

Standing at a higher level of criticism, the Sautrāntika (as well as the other Buddhist systems except the Vaibhāṣika) rejects the notion of a permanent entity's capacity to do work and thus be the cause of anything. Here, for example, the Sautrāntika reasons that, although space never impedes movement, and in that sense motion may be considered a function of space, space itself is never actually a mover or an efficient cause of motion, because objects in space are sometimes in motion, sometimes at rest, whereas space itself is permanent. If space is sometimes a mover and sometimes a

nonmover, then inasmuch as the nature of space is changing, space must be impermanent; and this is not so. The same argument was often used by Buddhism against a permanent god *(īśvara)* as the creator of the world: For if there is a time when god does not create the world and a time when he does create it, then because his nature changes, god is not permanent; or, if there is a time of his not creating the world and god is permanent, then he cannot create the world; or, if god, being permanent, is always creating the world, then the world is also permanent and consequently does not depend for its existence on creation by god, a relation of cause and effect being precluded, since the cause and the effect cannot exist at the same time;[27] and so on. Similarly, whatsoever is accepted as permanent cannot be the cause of anything, and therefore permanent uncaused entities (*asaṃskṛta* dharmas) such as space must be accepted as nonfunctional *(artha krīya asamārthaya)* and nonactual *(abhāva)*, the *definiens* of an actual *(bhāva)* being efficient functionality as stated previously. Thus, contrary to the Vaibhāṣika, which accepts all entities (dharmas) to be functional entities, here in the Sautrāntika, only caused entities (i.e., *bhāva*) are functional, whereas uncaused entities (i.e., *abhāva*) are nonfunctional.

Consequently, if something is uncaused *(asaṃskṛta)* and permanent, this is only because it is nonfunctional and hence not existent as anything independent of a concept. This does not mean, however, that these uncaused entities (*asaṃskṛta* dharmas) are completely inexistent, for, as stated, in contradistinction to nonentities (non-dharmas) such as the rabbit's horns, they may be known through a source of uncontradicted knowledge. On the other hand, their existence being totally dependent upon conceptual ascription (i.e., a name and a concept), they are purely noetic entities or *ficta*, in contradistinction to caused entities (*saṃskṛta* dharmas) such as a pot, the existence of which is not dependent on conceptual ascription since caused entities are the direct objects of sense perception and consequently directly cognizable without recourse to naming and conceptualizing. The former, an ob-

ject of right cognition which exists as a mere *fictum*, is the general character *(sāmanyalakṣaṇa)*. The latter, an object of right cognition which exists by way of its own condition of existing without being a mere *fictum*, is the self-subsistent character *(svalakṣaṇa)* or thing existing independently of conceptual ascription. Thus, uncaused entities such as space exist as phenomena merely, whereas caused entities such as a pot exist as ultimates. Here, the *siddhānta Rin po che'i phreng ba* states:

> Space, which is an uncaused entity *[asaṃskṛta]* is called phenomenal truth because it is real in the face of the phenomenology of cognition, and this "phenomenal" [*saṃvṛti*, lit. "covered up"] means a *fictum* because [thought] obscures the thing which is existent in itself *[svalakṣaṇa]*. . . However, if something is real for the conception belonging to the phenomenology of cognition it is not necessarily included in phenomenal truth, because even an example of ultimate truth, like a pot, is real for the conception belonging to the phenomenology of cognition; likewise [things] such as the self of an individual *[pudgala]* or permanent sound which are real for the conception of a phenomenological cognition do not exist conventionally *[vyavahāra sat]* or as phenomena *[saṃvṛti sat]*.[28]

Thus, the meaning of phenomenal truth *(saṃvṛti satya)* as opposed to the etymological meaning of phenomenal (*saṃvṛti*, lit., "covered up") is an object of cognition which does not exist ultimately (the two truths being dichotomous), but the existence of which is conventionally established through a source of prime right cognition *(pramāṇa)*.

Here, a radical reduction of hypostatized entities has taken place, i.e., the elimination altogether of an independent universal, for if all existents are not substantives, inasmuch as some, such as *asaṃskṛta* dharmas, are determinable not as substantively existent *(dravya siddha)* but as existent through logical construct *(pramāṇa siddha)*, then the object of the general or universal, itself either a substantive or a logical construct, may be determined to exist substantively only when every particular subsumed by the universal is a caused

entity (*saṃskṛta* dharma). In such instances—such as "the blue"—the particular and the general, although logically different,[29] are the same entity because neither the particular nor the general has any other referent than the thing which exists independently of conceptual ascription, namely, the *svalakṣaṇa* or self-subsistent character of the thing. Thus, "this blue" (the particular blue) and "the blue" (the general blue) not being two different entities, the object of the universal even though it exists substantively does not exist independently or as other than that of the particular, and vice versa. On the other hand, it often happens that every particular instance subsumed by the universal is not a caused entity—for example, "existence," "object of cognition," "relation," "one," "two," and so on. Taking the example of "existence," space which is uncaused exists; hence, inasmuch as we have a specimen of an existent which is uncaused, an entity which exists without recourse to a cause, "existence" does not need to depend on causes and is permanent. Universals of this type are *asaṃskṛta* dharmas, hence not existent as substantives *(dravya siddha)* but as logical constructs *(pramāṇa siddha)*, and consequently the number of *asaṃskṛta* dharmas, far from being just the three accepted by the Vaibhāṣika, is almost unlimited, for it includes numerous universals and abstractions and all relations.

Here, in the Sautrāntika, everything which exists, whether caused or uncaused *(saṃskṛta* or *asaṃskṛta)*, is nonetheless said to be "determinable as self-subsistent" *(svalakṣaṇa-siddha)*.[30] Since uncaused entities, which are not self-subsistents *(svalakṣaṇa)*, but only generals *(sāmanyalakṣaṇa)*, are being called *svalakṣaṇa-siddha*, determinable as self-subsistent, the term *svalakṣaṇa-siddha* is of a somewhat wider application. It signifies not only the self-subsistent thing which exists independently of the conception (for this is only the caused entity), it also includes general entities which exist as phenomena by way of a final dependence on other things which are of a self-subsistent character—for example, space, the cognition of which depends finally upon objects in space which are

self-subsistents. As a definition of *svalakṣaṇa-siddha*, Je tsun pa gives the following in *Dbus ma'i sphyi don:* "At the time of investigating an object which is designated by a name, one finds [something]."[31] Again, if investigation of something designated by a name or expression leads *at the time of investigation* to the discovery of some object as opposed to absolutely nothing at all, as in the instance of "rabbit's horns," that object is some kind of entity and not a nonentity altogether, inasmuch as something is found. Hence, whatever exists is existent by way of a self-subsistent character, either its own or the self-subsistent character of other things.

All these definitions and distinctions stated in connection with the Sautrāntika, which follows reason, are accepted with some modification by both the Yogācāra and the Svātantrika Mādhyamika, and form important elements of the theories of both these systems.

In the Yogācāra, all existents (dharmas) are grouped according to its own cardinal doctrine of *svabhāva-trāya* or three natures as set forth in the *Saṅdhinirmocana-sūtra*. Here, all uncaused entities (*asaṃskṛta* dharmas)—with the exception of śūnyatā—are counted as ascribed entities *(parikalpita)*, and these do not exist self-subsistently *(svalakṣaṇa asiddha)*. All caused entities or originates (*saṃskṛta* dharmas) are counted as dependent entities *(paratantra)*, and these are accepted as self-subsistently existent *(svalakṣaṇa siddha)*. Śūnyatā, which is an *asaṃskṛta* dharma and signifies the two emptinesses of individuals and things (*pudgala* and dharma *nairātmya*), is counted as a final nature *(pariniṣpanna)*. In the Yogācāra system, śūnyatā is the single *asaṃskṛta* dharma exempted from being classified as an ascribed entity *(parikalpita)*, and it alone among *asaṃskṛta* dharmas is accepted as self-subsistently existent.

As for *parikalpita* and *paratantra*, despite a difference of terminology, everything already stated about *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta* dharmas holds here, with one important modification—the difference with which the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra employ the terms *svalakṣaṇa* and *svalakṣaṇa-sid-*

dha. The Yogācārins define both *svalakṣaṇa* and *svalakṣaṇa-siddha* as "existent without being dependent on conception."[32] Consequently, both "*svalakṣaṇa*" and "*svalakṣaṇa-siddha*" both have exactly the same range of application, and both signify only a thing which is itself self-subsistent and never something the cognition of which depends upon the self-subsistent character of other things, as in the Sautrāntika instances just given. Thus, in the Yogācāra anything existent by its self-subsistent character exists likewise as an ultimate *(paramārtha sat)*. In fact, the Yogācārins are saying, just like the Sautrāntika, that (with the Yogācārin exemption of śūnyatā) all *asaṃskṛta* dharmas are conceptual constructs and exist as phenomena merely, whereas *saṃskṛta* dharmas exist as ultimates. Unlike the Sautrantika, however, *saṃskṛta* dharmas are not the ultimate truth, for ultimate truth is only the final natures (*pariniṣpanna* = the two *nairātmyas*). Thus, as the two truths are dichotomous, all existents, both caused and uncaused, ultimates or nonultimates, are, with the exception of śūnyatā, phenomenal truth.

On the two truths for the Yogācāra, Vasubandhu states in the *Vyākhyāyukti*: "*Parama* [highest] is the gnosis *[jñāna]* which transcends the world, and because it is the object *[ārtha]* of this gnosis, it is *paramārtha* [object of the highest gnosis]."[33]

'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa explains this passage in the following way: "The character of *paramārtha* is its being the final object of understanding of the path of purification, specifically, the two emptinesses, of a thing such as the skandhas, etc. and of an individual [*pudgala* and dharma *nairātmya*]."[34] Thus, except for the final natures *(pariniṣpanna)* which are the two emptinesses *(nairātmya)*, i.e., of individuals and of entities, all things are phenomenal.

Likewise, for the Mādhyamika as for the Yogācāra, all things are phenomenal *(saṃvṛti)* except śūnyatā, i.e., the two *nairātmyas* which are *paramārtha*; however, there is a profound difference between the two systems in what is understood here, and this difference may be seen from the following discussion of *pariniṣpanna*.

Thus far, the two schools of the Hīnayāna, the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, have been accepting both a substantive matter and a substantive mind and a cause and effect relation between them; in the act of cognizing the pot, for example, the pot existent as a conglomeration of atoms is a cause of its cognition, which is a mental. For this reason, in contradistinction to a concept, the direct object of which is a general image or mental representation, the Sautrāntika hold direct perception always to be nonillusory, because the direct object of perception is the *svalakṣaṇa* or thing which exists independently of conceptual ascription. The Yogācāra, on the other hand, while admitting direct perception to be *nondelusive* in respect to its object of cognition, will not admit it to be *nonillusory*.[35] Yogācāra goes a step farther, holding that not only is there no need to postulate a real substantive matter behind its cognition, but that it is clearly erroneous to do so. Not only is a substantive matter not to be found, but its existence is an impossibility; if a real material substance exists, then one ought to be able to find, at least by way of an intellectual analysis, a final particle of matter or ultimate atom, but such a final material atom is not to be found, on account of infinite divisibility. Hence, the Yogācāra, regarding an independent substantive material stuff as still another hypostatized entity, views the external object *(bāhyārtha)* seen in cognition as another modality of a mental substance rather than a separate material stuff causing the cognition. Hence, although there is a logical difference between cognizer and cognitum, they are both a single substantive entity and that is a mental. Consequently, the cognitum is illusory in the sense that, although it is purely mental, it appears as a nature other than a mental by way of appearing as a real external object, i.e., an independent substantive material stuff. In the same way, the cognizor is illusory inasmuch as its manifest object is illusory. Nonillusory is simply the absence of a substantive difference between the cognizer and cognitum. This is nonduality, and this nonduality is the ultimate truth and the meaning of the emptiness of dharmas for the Yogācāra.

In the Mādhyamika, nonduality and the emptiness of dharmas is something quite different. Of the systems, the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra share in common the acceptance that whatever is the ultimate truth *(paramārtha satya)* exists as an ultimate, i.e., is *paramārtha sat*. In the Mādhyamika, on the other hand, existence in ultimate reality *(paramārtha sat)* is the very thing which is negated by *paramārtha satya*. Consequently, in the Mādhyamika, *paramārtha satya* is the mere nonexistence of a thing—the table, for instance, as an ultimate or as a real. Thus, in the Yogācāra, śūnyatā is a final nature *(pariniṣpanna)*, the supreme object of the path of purification, unthinkable, unutterable, and nondual because it is free of a difference between cognizer *(grāhaka)* and cognitum *(grāhya)*; it is empty *(śūnya)* of all things except its own existence in reality, for it exists as an ultimate; it is *paramārtha sat*. On this kind of śūnyatā, Kamalaśīla says in the first *Bhāvanakrama*, "Thus, that understanding of nonduality which is held by the consciousness doctrine [Vijñānavāda] as the highest truth is empty, and by the wisdom of the unmanifest *[nirabhaṣa]* the yogin comes to see this nonduality as ultimately unreal,"[36] for "as things are not really produced from self or other, the cognizer and cognitum are ultimately unreal altogether, and since understanding of nonduality is not of something other than these two and is also upon investigation a nonreal, one must turn away from apprehending this nondual understanding as an ultimate."[37] Thus, emptiness in the Mādhyamika means empty of its own realness, of its own existence as an ultimate *(paramārtha sat)*, as well. Although the Mādhyamika is a nondualist system in the sense that it does not admit an ultimate substantive difference between cognition and its object, duality is not the prime target of the Mādhyamika's criticisms. In the Mādhyamika, nonduality is just the sameness of the cognition *(viṣayin)* and its object *(viṣaya)* by virtue of their inexistence as reals. It is the notion of realistic existence or a real being which is the main target of the Mādhyamika's denials. The nonexistence of all things by way of a real being subsumes the nonduality of cognition and its

object, for in such emptiness of real being there is no differentiation *(viśeṣa)*.

The Mādhyamika's reason for this emptiness of a real being is the dependent-arising *(pratītya-samutpāda)* of all existents. That which is a dependent-arising does not exist by virtue of its real being *(svabhāva)*, and this emptiness of real being is a thing's dependent-arising.

Thus, in the Mādhyamika the meaning of dependent-arising is considerably more comprehensive than in the other systems of Buddhism. For the others, "dependent" *(pratītya)* means "dependent upon causes and conditions," and "arising" *(samutpāda)* means "origination"; "dependent-arising" is an origination in dependence on causes and conditions. This means that only caused entities (*saṃskṛta* dharmas) are accepted by the other Buddhist schools as dependent-arisings. However, since the *Kārikās* state, "because there is nothing which is not a dependent-arising, there is nothing which is not empty *(śūnya)*,"[38] the Mādhyamika is accepting all existents (*sarva* dharma) as dependent-arisings. This means not only caused entities (*saṃskṛta* dharmas) but uncaused entities (*asaṃskṛta* dharmas) as well. Consequently, the meaning as well as the application here of "dependent-arising" is more comprehensive than that given previously. "Dependent" means "dependent upon other than self," whereas "arising" means "existing." Here, then, dependent-arising is existence in dependence upon other than self, and this "dependence upon other than self" subsumes "origination in dependence on causes and conditions" while depriving origination itself of the force of a real production. This comprehensive sense of a dependent-arising is stated in the *Kārikās* thus: "As the agent is dependent on the act, and the action on the agent, no producing cause is seen, save only a dependent arising."[39] This passage is commented upon in *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* as follows:

> Thus, it is said that the existence of the agent is in dependence on the action, but that there is no [real] production of the action of the agent, and where it is said that one ought to

> employ this line of reasoning to other things, it is stated that a prime right cognition *[pramāṇa]* and its object, a *probans* and a *probandum*, exist in dependence upon one another, but that it is not correct that one [really] produces the other. Similarly, the *Ratnāvali* says, "When this exists that arises *[asmin sati idam bhāvati]*" is like when there is a short there is a long. Thus it is said also that it is just as the short is not the producer of the long.[40]

Again, just as a dependent-arising, in the limited sense of an origination in dependence on causes, while negating the permanence of anything caused, establishes conversely the cause and effect of karma, similarly a dependent-arising in the more comprehensive sense of existent in dependence upon other than self, while negating the existence of anything as an ultimate, does establish the existence of things phenomenally. Here again we may quote Nāgārjuna and the comment of *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho.*

Nāgārjuna says in the *Śūnyatā-saptati:*

> Because all these things are empty of a real being *[svabhāva]*, this is their dependent-arising, *[pratītya-samutpāda]*. The meaning of the emptiness *[śūnyatā]* which is taught by the imcomparable Tathāgata ends with just that. The Buddha, the Blessed Lord, names all the various things by having recourse to the conventional expressions of the world.[41]

and *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* comments:

> Thus, it is stated that origination and all the rest are set forth having been named from the point of view of their nominal expressions, because the final meaning of the reality of phenomenal things ends with just this devoidness of a real being, their dependent-arising. The *Kārikās* say, "The doctrine taught by the Buddhas has recourse to two truths." By stating this also, he shows that the emptiness of a real being is the ultimate truth and that origination, and the like, are conventional; but were he not to state as above [i.e., in the *Śūnyatā-saptati]*, someone, not understanding that the meaning of conventional existence is just the phenomenal order of things from the point of view of their nominal predication, may fail to understand

> —after so many logical rejections of a real being have been put forward—that the meaning of the statement that all the various things exist by way of their nominal predication is this very establishment of their nonreal being.[42]

Thus, it was the genius of Nāgārjuna which gave a startlingly profound answer to a question which few other philosophers had even seen fit to raise, and he answered negatively by deliberation what others were answering affirmatively by presupposition—that for an appearance of something, there must be some basis or ground which is determinably existent as an ultimate *(paramārtha sat)*. It is just the absence of such a basis which the Mādhyamika has accepted as the highest truth *(paramārtha satya)* and has sought to demonstrate its discoverability through diverse lines of reasoning as well as by criticism of the various entities accepted as ultimates by other schools of thought.

The question arises, if the śūnyatā of the Mādhyamika, unlike that of the Yogācāra, does not exist ultimately *(paramārthatas)* or absolutely by virtue of a real being *(svabhāvatas)*, how does it exist? As stated previously, to exist means here to exist as a phenomenon merely, because it is held that nothing exists as an ultimate. Consequently, śūnyatā is the ultimate truth by virtue of being the supreme object of knowledge of an ārya's gnosis *(āryajñāna)*, but it exists conventionally or phenomenally because its existence conventionally, like any other thing which may be admitted as existent, is determinable by right cognition dependent upon the objects of conventional expressions. Thus, by way of the nonexistence of śūnyatā itself in ultimate reality, an emptiness of emptiness is delineated.

Thus, in the Mādhyamika, ultimate truth is simply śūnyatā itself, i.e., the nonexistence of all things as reals or as ultimates; phenomenal truth is all things admissable as existent, with the exception of śūnyatā, which is the ultimate truth but existent conventionally. However, the full implication of this "nonexistence as a real" is understood differently

by the two main systems of the Mādhyamika, the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika. For the Prāsaṅgikas the negation that things exist as ultimates entails the denial that they exist even conventionally by way of any kind of self-subsistent character *(svalakṣaṇa-asiddha)*, whereas for the Svātantrikas such a denial represents an extreme in the direction of nihilism.

Briefly stated, the Prāsaṅgikas hold that things do not exist as ultimates precisely because they do not exist even as phenomena by way of a self-subsistent character *(svalakṣaṇa-siddha)*. The definition of *svalakṣaṇa-siddha* here is as previously stated: "At the time of investigating the object which is designated by an expression [and a concept], one discovers [something]," but *at the time of investigation* the Prāsaṅgika discovers nothing. As stated by the *Satyadvayāvatara*, "When the phenomenon as it appears is investigated by reason, nothing is discovered, and this nothing-to-be-discovered is itself the ultimate truth."[43]

For the Svātantrika, on the other hand, to state the foregoing bluntly without some qualification would be to fall into the problem of the determinancy of cognition. Although not existent as ultimates, things must exist conventionally by way of some sort of self-subsistent character; otherwise, why not perceive a tree or even a cow where one is perceiving a table? Consequently, when a Svātantrika Mādhyamika denies origination, for instance, he always qualifies his negation by an "ultimately" *(paramārthatas)*, because "there is no origination ultimately." By his negation of a real being, he means only that there is no real being as an ultimate. In *Legs bshad snying po*, Tsong kha pa seeks to explain the Svātantrika's position here with a comparison to a magical or hypnotic illusion whereby a piece of wood or a stone is made to appear as a horse or an elephant:

> When a piece of wood or stone [which are] the basis of the illusion appear to the affected vision as a horse or an elephant, it is just an appearance as such to the consciousness, but it cannot be said that the wood, etc. do not appear so. In just the

same way, when there is the appearance of a sprout from a seed, this is nothing more than merely an appearance, but it cannot be said that this is not produced from that. Should one think, then, that inasmuch as the sprout is produced from a seed [existing] on its own side, it is produced ultimately, there is no criticism, for although there is an appearance likewise of a horse or an elephant from the side of the basis of the illusion [i.e., the wood or stone, etc.], the appearance as such is by virtue of the consciousness belonging to the affected vision, but there is not as there seems a production [of a horse or an elephant] from causes and conditions having an inherent nature. Thus, to hold that there is a production by the power of an inherent nature without admitting [also] by the power of appearing to mind [which is] the ground of the cognition *[viṣayin]* is to hold that there is a production as [a something] ultimate, and in these terms, one should understand the [Svātantrika's] statement "to exist ultimately and in reality," and likewise the statements of the existence-nonexistence of production, etc. of all things [as qualified by the expressions] "in reality," "as an ultimate object," or "in truth."[44]

Consequently, the distinctions of *sva* and *sāmanyalakṣaṇa*, as discussed previously, are accepted by the Svātantrika Mādhyamika, just as by the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra, with one important difference: whereas for the two latter, whatever is existent by way of a self-subsistent character *(svalakṣaṇa-siddha)* exists as an ultimate *(paramārtha-siddha)*, for the Svātantrika Mādhyamika, both *sva* and *sāmanyalakṣaṇa* are phenomenal truth, for nothing is admitted to exist as an ultimate.

In their discussions of the two truths, little clear and distinct difference actually emerges, at least on the level of meaning, between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika. It is principally in their way of explaining the three natures *(svabhāva traya)* set forth in the *Saṇdhinirmocana-sūtra* that their differences come forth most sharply.[45] Consequently, any effort to distinguish between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika needs to take into account

both *satya-dvaya* and *svabhāvatraya* together, and this would entail introducing another complex topic which cannot be explored here.

Investigation of the points of controversy between the two varieties of Mādhyamika is perhaps one of the most rewarding studies in Buddhist philosophy, and the few salient points set forth here are necessarily much too brief. They represent the opinion of Tibetan scholarship, which inherited fairly intact the systems of later Indian Buddhism. Tibetan scholarship in turn is overwhelmingly indebted to Tsong kha pa, whose breadth of rigorous scholarly investigation and depth of philosophical penetration easily entitle him to a place among the foremost *ācāryas* of the Mādhyamika. To attempt to reconstruct the thought of Nāgārjuna set forth in the *Kārikās* and other treatises without the writings of Tsong kha pa would probably be as thankless a task as to attempt to reconstruct the metaphysics of Aristotle without the works of Thomas Aquinas. What particularly distinguishes Tibetan interpretation of the Mādhyamika is its unique way of doing away altogether with substantialist thinking, without falling into either the logical or the ethical relativism characteristic of much contemporary effort to relinquish substantialist thought. Tibetan scholarship does not seem to have found that the denial of every kind of self-subsistence and the relegation of all things to mere words and concepts require the reduction of logical categories to pure operational expedients or the reduction of the objects of all concepts to mere indeterminates; neither does it seem to have had to posit a need to abandon rational thinking, finally, in favor of an aesthetic intuitionalism. These features in particular, the author thinks, commend it to serious study and consideration.

The four schools examined here have each sought to provide the necessary philosophical substructure upon which to view the full import and meaning of the *anātma* doctrine. In the Vaibhāṣika, with its realist notion of nonexistence, the no-self of the individual was viewed as a real, whereas in the Sautrāntika, standing at a higher level of criticism, it was a

nonreal. With the development of still more critical theories, whether based on dialectical or epistemological considerations, some kind of no-self of existents, in the sense already indicated, had also to be taken into account. This, in turn, conditioned and deepened the meaning of the no-self of the individual. With the Yogācāra, we have two kinds of no-self, both of which are reals and again, with the Mādhyamika, a still more critical position for which both kinds of no-self are nonreals. In turn, these different ways of understanding the import of the no-self doctrine conditioned the type of meditation which was founded on each, and each has served as a theoretical basis for the development of the Buddhist path.

NOTES

1. The idea of the Buddha's having taught three distinct positions is set forth in the *Saṅdhinirmocana-sūtra*, which served as the basis for the systematization of the Yogācāra philosophy at the hands of Asanga and Vasubandhu. The division of the Buddhist schools into four is clearly to be found in such (ca. sixth-century) works as Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahṛdaya* and its autocommentary, the *Tarkajvālā*.

The three turnings of the dharma-wheel and their respective ontological positions are set forth in the seventh chapter of the *Saṅdhinirmocana-sūtra*, where the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata questions the Buddha about the discrepancy between his statements that origination, destruction, the four truths, the mind-body aggregates, and so on are self-subsistents and his statements that all existents are "without a self-subsistence, without an origination, without a cessation, quiescent from the start, inherently gone beyond ill" (*Saṅdhinirmocana-sūtra*, Peking reprint edition, vol. 29, folio 17b ff.).

2. A realism versus a constructionism, i.e., a view holding things to be truly existent as they appear versus a view holding things to be appearances to cognition merely. As used here, a real denotes an entity which does not depend for its existence on a name and concept, whereas a construct denotes an entity which has no existence of its own independently of naming. From the point of view of the four schools, the Vaibhāṣika is pure realism in holding that all things admissable into the category of existent are existent independently of naming, whereas the Prāsaṅgika has taken a completely opposite course of determination, that all existents are constructs merely. The Sautrāntika-, Yogācāra-, and Svātantrika-Mādhyamika

occupy intermediate positions, determining some existents as reals and some as constructs. The Sautrāntika has determined more existence on the side of realism; the Yogācāra and Svātantrika more existence on the side of constructionism, the Yogācāra allowing more on the realist side than the Svātantrika.

3. Nag tsho lotsaba's *Bstod pa brgyad cu pa*, a eulogy of Atīśa in eighty ślokas, quoted extensively in the *Lam rim chen mo* of Tsong kha pa. Nag tsho draws a picture of the Indian monastery of Vikramaśīla in the eleventh century in which adherents of all four schools were living side by side under one roof (*Lam rim chen mo*, Peking reprint edition, vol. 152, 5b).

4. For mythopoetic cosmological formulations antecendent to Greek speculative efforts, see discussion of Hesiod's *Theogany*, the *Heptamuchos* of Pherecydes of Syros, and so on in the "Forerunners of Philosophical Cosmology," in Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), pg. 8 ff.

In India, Upanaṣadic speculation is already prefigured allegorically in such later works of the Vedic period as the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, where the Upanaṣadic Brahman emerges allegorically under the guise of the Vedic Prajāpati through a series of analogical identifications, i.e., the "Year" = "time" = "space" = "the all" = "the universe" = "the sacrifice" = (most importantly of all) Prajāpati, who in turn is equated with the puruṣa, or primeval Man, who is sacrificed in the creation of the world.

5. Although the Sāṃkhya is a dualistic system in the sense of accepting an ultimate distinction between the knower and the known, puruṣa and prakṛti, only prakṛti is an active creative principle involved in causal production.

6. The cycle of a descent and ascent of the soul is of course symbolical, because in the Sāṃkhya the soul is completely impassive and, consequently, is never actually defiled or purified. This was one of the cardinal Buddhist objections to a soteriology of the Upaniṣadic type, for what, they asked, is defilement and a path of purification to the intrinsically pure?

7. Cited in Porphory's "De Anthro Nympharum," in Thomas Taylor, ed., *Select Works of Porphory* (London: T. Rodd, 1823, pg. 178).

8. Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, pg. 205.

9. F. M. Cornford, "Mystery Religions and Pre-Socratic Philosophy," *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 4, ch. 15 (Cambridge: University Press, 1939).

10. The generalization that Buddhism did not admit a substantive difference between substance and attribute is made from the point of view of the mainstream of Buddhist thought, as the Vaibhāṣika is the exception which did admit such a difference. This is discussed elsewhere in the study.

11. The Buddhist atom is also a momentary entity constituting a stochastic continuum.

12. The efforts of Stcherbatsky to interpret the Mādhyamika as a monism of the Parmenidean type has by now been fairly discredited by subsequent scholarship, although it is to Stcherbatsky's credit to have seen a similar absolutist use of logic being employed by both Parmenides and Nāgārjuna (*Buddhist Logic*, vol. 1 [New York: Dover Publications, 1962]).

13. The *ti to on aei genesin de ouk echon* and the *ti to gignomenon men aei on de oudepote* of Plato's *Timaeus*, 28 A.

14. Objection (*Mādhyamika kārikās*, Chapter XXIV):

> If all these are empty *(śūnya)*, it follows that you don't have an origination, nor a destruction, nor the four noble truths.

Response (*Mādhyamika kārikās*, Chapter XXIV):

> If these are not empty, it follows that you don't have an origination, nor a destruction, nor the four noble truths. (Tibetan translation, Chapter XXIV, Peking edition, vol. 95, 19a.)

15. The entire *Vigraha-vyavārtini* of Nāgārjuna is devoted to answering this objection of the indeterminacy of cognition, an objection which is stated in the introductory śloka: "If the self-nature of every existent is without being, words, being without self-nature, cannot reject a self-nature."

16. That is, in the *Vigraha-vyavārtini*.

17. A rough paraphrase of the *Madhyāntavibhaga*'s "the unreal imaginings *[abhūtaparikalpita]* exist." This somewhat obscure term is taken by Tsong kha pa in the Vijñānavādin section of *Legs bshad nying po* as signifying every kind of *paratantra-svabhāva*, the *abhutaparikalpita* being one of its principal instances or examples.

18. Most notably, in Dignāga's introductory salutation in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

19. The possible existence of a distinct Tathāgatagarbhavāda in India is likely to be a point of controversy among Buddhologists for some time to come. In his *Study of the Ratnagotravibhaga* (Serie Orientale Roma), for example, Takasaki presumes the existence of a Tathāgatagarbha school as a third Mahāyāna school in India in addition to the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika, but Takasaki, apparently looking more to the fortunes of the tathāgatagarbha theory in China, has not really posed the question of whether or not such an independent school ever existed in India. There are, to be sure, about ten important Buddhist sūtras expounding the theory of a tathāgatagarbha, but if these teachings were ever formulated to serve as the basis of an independent school, who were its *ācāryas* and why did tathāgatagarbha theory become the common property of both the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika? And if it were also an independent school, how did it escape being so treated by such Mādhyamika *ācāryas* as

Bhāvaviveka, who were writing shortly after the time of the composition of the *Ratnagotravibhaga* by Maitreyanātha?

20. Although the Sautrāntika ontology displays many features common to the Yogācāra, especially in distinguishing between a self-subsistent and a mentally constructed, its final determination is that all existents are reals, for it holds all existents (dharmas) to exist self-subsistently *(svalakṣaṇa siddha)*, that is to say, either self-subsistent in themselves, like the scholastic *in se sistendo*, or dependent on the self-subsistence of others, like the *in alio inhaerendo*, e.g., space, the notion of which is dependent on objects in space. This way of viewing existence brings the Sautrāntika into conformity with the first turning of the dharma-wheel that all existents are reals, in spite of the scope it gives to the constructed. (See the essay by Geshe Sopa in this volume for some further discussion.) The Yogācāra, on the other hand, excludes from existing self-subsistently *(svalakṣaṇa siddha)* all things which lack their own self-subsistence. These differences in their respective uses of terminology was raised to the surface by Tsong kha pa in *Legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath: Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), p. 56, and subsequently has been further expatiated in the Tibetan *yig-chas* or textbooks used in the monastic colleges.

21. Again, it is the Vaibhāṣika which provides some exception to this uncompromising denial of a substantive ego, for among the eighteen subschools of the Vaibhāṣika, there were some, notably the Vātsīputrīya, which although not denying a self which was an independent, permanent unity such as was accepted by the non-Buddhists, did accept a self which was existent as an independent substantive. It was not, however, denotable as permanent or impermanent, or the same as or different from the mind-body aggregates, the skandhas. This has given rise to discussion and controversy among traditional Buddhist scholars about whether or not this kind of Vaibhāṣika was a holder of a Buddhist theory.

22. In this paper, the term "phenomenology of cognition" is used to signify any act of cognition or anything appearing to cognition. Where this sense is not explicitly indicated by the context, it signifies any act or object of cognition *except* the object apprehended by a wrong conceptual cognition (conceptual in contradistinction to perceptual). Here, the object of conceptual cognition is viewed as twofold, i.e., the *manifest object* and the *apprehended object*. As in the instance of the rabbit's horns, "rabbit's horns" are existent as the object which is manifest to their conception, and both the conception and its object *qua* an object of a conception exist, but they are nonexistent as the object which is apprehended or grasped by thought, the latter object being a nonphenomenon.

23. The final development of the Tibetan *grub mtha'* or *siddhānta* literature occurred within an illustrious circle of encyclopedic scholars associated with Dgong lung monastery in Amdo Province in the latter half

of the eighteenth century, most notably, Lchang-skya, Jig-med dbang-po, and Thu'u bkwan, who in turn look back principally to 'Jam dbang bzhad pa, whose *Grub mtha' chen mo* gave the Tibetan *grub mtha'* its present form. All the foregoing have left large compilations of their literary works, but the fame of each as writers rests mainly on their respective works on *grub mtha'*, or delineation of the positions of the philosophical schools. While taking Indian works such as Bhāvaviveka's *Tarkajvālā* and Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* as models, *Grub mtha' chen mo* also utilizes the classics of Tibetan Buddhist scholarship, most notably *Legs bshad snying po*. This is Tsong kha pa's single most decisive and significant work of scholarship, dealing with the positions of the schools of the Mahāyāna in India, and one in which he virtually created a kind of metalanguage for reaching the rock-bottom essentials of Indian Buddhist thought. *Grub mtha' chen mo* deals with all the principal schools of Indian philosophy, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, systematically and in detail. It covers Indian materialism, the philosophy of the Jains, the six schools of Brahmanical orthodoxy (the six *darśanas*), and the four schools of Indian Buddhism, and is justifiably famous for its erudition and the wealth of important information which it brings together into one place. It was followed by other works of the same genre, most notably Lchang-skya's *Thub bstan-lhun po'i mdzes rgyan (Embellishment to Adorn the Four-Sided Mountain of the Muni's Teaching)*, and Jig med dbang po's *Rin po che'i phren ba (Precious Garland)*. Lchang-skya's *Embellishment to Adorn the Four-Sided Mountain of the Muni's Teaching*, a lengthy and substantial work, is distinguished by its style and clarity of presentation, whereas Jig med dbang po's *Precious Garland*, an extremely abbreviated treatment of the same subjects, has provided a most valuable introduction to the study of the Indian philosophical schools. Finally, Thu'u bkomn, a pupil of both Lchang-skya and Jig med byang po, attempted for the first time to deal systematically with the Tibetan schools as well and composed the *Legs bshad shel gyi me long (The Crystal Mirror: An Exposition of the Tenets and Sources of All the Philosophical Schools)*, an extremely learned and polished work in twelve chapters dealing principally with the Tibetan schools. These are treated historically since the Tibetan schools share in common the four positions of Indian Buddhism and cannot be simply delineated by means of doctrinal differences. Jig med dbang po's *Precious Garland* has been translated and published by H. Guenther under the title *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice* (London: Penguin Books, 1971). However, because this translation is full of obscurantisms and omissions of many important passages of the original text, the text has been retranslated by Geshe Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins and is included, along with another text, in *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, (London: Rider and Co., 1976).

24. *Rin po che'i phreng ba* (Dharmasala, India: 1967), p. 20.

25. *Grub mtha' chen mo* (Masuri, India: 1962), Ga, 2b.

26. "Prime right cognition" is an attempt at translation, or rather paraphrase, of *pramāṇa* according to its definition in the hands of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as "new" and "unerroneous" cognition. See F. T. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (The Hague: 1958), pp. 62 ff. and 64 ff.

27. In the logic of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, only two kinds of logical relation are allowed, tautology and causality. If two objects are related and exist at the same time, the relation is viewed as one of identity, or as tautological. In other words, different names and concepts are being deposited on a single perceptual substratum, i.e., the object is cognized by a cognition which is nonconceptual and which is consequently viewed as a purely perceptual cognition. On the other hand, if two objects existing at different times are related, this relation is viewed as one of cause and effect. This relation is defined as the effect's dependence for its production upon the cause. Consequently, at the time of the effect's existence, since it already exists, there can be no dependence for its existence on a producer. Hence, it is argued that the produced and producer cannot be simultaneous. The reasons for this emerge most clearly in Dharmakīrti's *Sambandhapārikṣā (Examination of Relation)* in which all other relations posited by Indian philosophy are subjected to criticism and found objectionable. The crux of the matter is that they rest on the view of a relation which is substantively different from the *relatum*. Dharmakīrti seeks to argue that such a view is a mere presupposition which has under examination to be discarded. Dharmakīrti's own view that the relation between a logical relation and its *relata* is tautological can only support two possible relations, tautology itself and causality.

28. *Rin po che'i phreng ba*, p. 32.

29. I.e., pramāṇa-siddhi.

30. The discussion follows the Sautrāntika use of the term as as interpreted by *Legs bshad nying po*. See note 20.

31. *Tha snyad btags pa'i btags don btsal ba'i tshe na bsnyed pa rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa'i don no.* (*Dbus ma'i sphyi don*, Tibetan block print)

32. See notes 30 and 20.

33. *Grub mtha' chen mo*. Nga, 43a.

34. *Grub mtha' chen mo*. Nga, 43a.

35. Not nonillusory because, according to Yogācāra, perception which does not go beyond a mental nature represents objects existing externally or as having other than a mental nature.

36. *Tibetan Tripitaka*, vol. 102, f. 35b.

37. *Tibetan Tripitaka*, vol. 102, f. 35b.

38. *Tibetan Tripitaka*, vol. 95, f. 18a.

39. *Tibetan Tripitaka*, vol. 156, f. 154a.
40. *Tibetan Tripitaka*, vol. 156, f. 154b.
41. *Tibetan Tripitaka*, vol. 156, f. 148b.
42. *Tibetan Tripitaka*, vol. 156, f. 148b.
43. *Tibetan Tripitaka*, vol. 101, f. 146a.
44. *Tibetan Tripitaka*, vol. 153, f. 139a.
45. This careful probing of the works of Svātantrika and Mādhyamika authors and their way of accepting the *trisvabhāva* as a means of eliciting their actual thought is again the work of Tsong kha pa and is especially developed in *Legs bshad snying po*.

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The following abbreviations are used in the Bibliography.

WZKSO	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sud-und Ostastiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie
PQ	Philosophical Quarterly
JBBRAS	The Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JOAS	The Journal of Asian Studies
PEW	Philosophy East and West
JBORS	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society
BSOAS	(London University) School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin

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Glossary

Chinese and Japanese Words, Phrases, Names, and Titles

A

An-yao-chi 安樂集
A-p'i-t'an hsin lun [title] 阿毘曇心論

C

chao-chien 照見
chen shih hsiang [phrase] 眞實相
cheng 正
cheng chih 正智
cheng ting 正定
chi 集
chi wei 極微
chieh 戒
chieh fang pien kuan [phrase] 界方便觀
chien 見
chien hsing che yi chieh fang pien kuan tu [phrase] 見行者以界方便觀度
chih 止
chih-hui 智慧
chih-kuan 止觀
chih-te-kuo-fo-hsing [phrase] 至得果佛性
chi-lo [place name] 極樂
chi-lo wang-sheng [phrase] 極樂往生
ching 境
ching chieh 境界
ching chieh yi chieh ssu wei fen [phrase] 淨潔已解思性分
Ching-t'u [place name] 淨土
Ching-t'u lun [title] 淨土論
chung 中

Chung-shi [proper name] 仲希
chūeh kuan 覺觀
chūeh ting i chieh [phrase] 決定意解

CH'

ch'i ching 契經
ch'i sui shun ku [phrase] 起隨順故
Ch'ien Ch'ien-i [proper name] 錢謙益
ch'ūan-t'i [phrase] 筌蹄

F

fa-chieh yūan-ch'i [phrase] 法界緣起
Fa-chiu [Dharmatrāta?; proper name] 法救
Fa-sheng [proper name] 法勝
fa-t'i 法體
fen-ch'i 分齊
fen-tuan 分段
Fo-hsing lun [title] 佛性論
Fo-shuo kuan-wu-liang-shou-fo ching [title] 佛說觀無量寿佛經
Fo-shuo a-mi-t'o ching [title] 佛說阿彌陀經
Fo-shuo wu-liang-shou ching [title] 佛說無量寿經
fu hsieh 扶翼

G

gokuraku [Japanese place name] 極楽
gokuraku ōjō [Japanese phrase] 極楽往生

H

hai-yin san-mei 海印三昧
hsiang 想
hsiang 相
hsiang hsū fan lao [phrase] 相續煩勞
hsiang-tso 相作
hsiao 小
hsin 心
hsien sheng p'in [chapter title] 賢聖品
hsiu 修
hsiu fang pien 修方便
hsiu fei ch'ang chi k'u k'ung fei wo hsing hsiang [phrase] 修非常及苦空非我性相
hu-wang 互亡
hu-ts'un 互存
Hua-yen i ch'eng chiao i fen-ch'i chang [title] 華嚴一乘教義分齊章
Hua-yen wu chiao shih-kuan [title] 華嚴五教止觀
huai 壞
huai ching chieh [phrase] 壞境界
huan 幻
hui 慧

J

je nao 熱惱
jo nien nien fen pieh [phrase] 若念念分別
juan 軟
Jōdo [Japanese place name] 淨土

K

ken 根
ku 故
kuan 觀
kuan ch'a 觀察
Kuan tzu-tsai [proper name] 觀自在
Kuan-yin [proper name] 觀音
kung 共
kung hsiang 共相
Kyō-gyō-shin-shō [Japanese title] 教行信証

K'

k'ung 苦
k'ung 空

L

lao 勞
li 理
li-shih 理事
Li-tai san-pao-chi [title] 歷代三寶紀
liang 量
Liu Sung [proper name] 劉宋
liu-t'ung 流通
Lu-shan Hui-yüan [proper name] 廬山慧遠
lü 律

M

mi-mi-pan-jo [phrase] 祕密般若
mi-yü 祕語
mieh 滅
min 泯
ming chü wei shen [phrase] 名句味身
Moho chih-kuan [title] 摩訶止觀

N

neng-so 能所

O

ōjō [Japanese phrase] 往生

P

Pan-jo hsin-ching lüeh-shu-hsiao-ch'ao [title] 般若心經略疏小鈔
Pan-jo hsin-ching lüeh-shu-hsien-cheng-chi [title] 般若心經略疏顯正記
Pan-jo hsin-ching lüeh-shu-lien-chu-chi [title] 般若心經略疏連珠記
Pan-jo po-lo-mi-to hsin-ching lüeh-shu [title] 般若波羅密多心經略疏
pan-yao 般若
Pei-Ch'i [proper name] 北齊
Pieh yi tsa a-han ching [title] 別譯雜阿含經
pien-yi 變易
P'o-sou-p'an-tou fa-shih-ch'uan [title] 婆藪槃豆法師傳
pu 補
pu ching [phrase] 不淨
pu lo 不樂
pu tien tao [phrase] 不顛倒
pu tien tao hui [phrase] 不顛倒慧
pu t'ing hsin che pu neng ch'i cheng chien [phrase] 不停心者不能起正見
pu wang shou yüan ku [phrase] 不忘[妄]授[受]緣故

P'

p'ing-teng 平等
p'u [see *sa (p'u-sâ)*] 菩
p'u 溥

S

sa [see *p'u (p'u-sa)*] 薩
san 三
se 色
shan chih shih 善知識
shan ken tseng 善根增
shang 上
shen shen kuan nien ch'u [phrase] 身身觀念處
shen shih hsiang che wei pu tien tao hsiang ju yi yeh [phrase]
身實相者謂不顛相如義也
shih 事
shih 施
shih chieh ho ku yu so tsao tso [phrase] 識界合故有所造作
shih-hsiang 實相
Shih-hui [proper name] 師會
shih-shih wu-ai 事事無礙
shih tsu 識足
shih yeh 始業
shou 授
shou sui shun [phrase] 說隨順
ssu 思
ssu-chih 四執
ssu shih 四食
ssu shih chu 四識住

ssu tao 四倒
ssu wei yi tu [phrase] 思性已度
su-chi 速疾

T

Ta-ch'eng fa-chieh-wu-ch'a-pieh lun [title] 大乘法界無差別論
Ta-chih-tu lun [title] 大智度論
Tao-an [proper name] 道安
te fa chen shih hsiang [phrase] 得法眞實相
teng 等
Tsa a-han ching [title] 雜阿含經
tseng chang yang hsin sheng wu kou chih yen [phrase] 增長養心生無垢智眼
tsung 總
tuan 斷
tzu hsiang 自相
tzu hsiang nien ch'u [phrase] 自相念處
tzu hsin [phrase] 自心
tzu-hsing-chu-fo-hsing [phrase] 自性住佛性

T'

t'an yu 貪欲
t'ung kuan chu fa hsiang [phrase] 通貫諸法相

TZ'

tz'u hsin 此心

W

wang 亡
wang 忘
wang-sheng [phrase] 往生
Wang-sheng lun-chu [phrase] 往生論註
wei-ch'ang-pu-chin [phrase] 未嘗不盡
wei-ch'ang-pu-li [phrase] 未嘗不立
wei shou tsu teng t'ung shou tse sui chuan [phrase] 謂手足等痛受則隨轉
wei ts'eng te chūeh ting fen shan ken [phrase] 未曾得決定分善根
wei yi juan shan ken chung yi chung tseng [phrase] 謂依軟善根中依中增
wen 聞
wu 物
wu ch'ang 無常
wu chien teng sui [phrase] 無間等隨順
wu chu ch'u hsing [phrase] 無住處行
wu erh 無二
wu erh yu tz'u wu shih erh ming k'ung hsiang ku fei yu fei pu yi yi pu yi [phrase]
無二有此無是二名空相故非有非不異亦不一
wu hsiang 無上
Wu-liang-shou ching yu-p'o-t'i-she yuan-chieh-chu [title]
無量寿經優婆提舍願生偈註

Wu-liang shou-ching yu-p'o-t'i-she yang-sheng chieh [title]
無量寿經優婆提舍願生偈
wu-shang 無上
wu-teng 無等
wu-teng-teng [phrase] 無等等
wu wo 無我
wu yūan 無願

Y

yen li 厭離
yi 恚
yi 以
yi—ku [phrase] 以……故
yi hsi hsing [phrase] 已習行
yi shuo hsi ch'eng hsing [phrase] 已數習成行
yi tz'u shang yi sheng tao ku [phrase] 以此上一乘
yin 因
yin ch'u fo-hsing [phrase] 引出佛性
yu 由
yu-tz'u-wu [phrase] 有此無
yūan 緣